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The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) constitutes a cen-
tral component of a neural system for cognitive control 
(Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004). 
Theories about ACC function alternatively hold that it is 
responsible for detecting response conflict (Botvinick, 
Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001) or for the adap-
tive modification of behavior by relating actions with their 
consequences (Holroyd & Coles, 2002, 2008; Rushworth, 
Walton, Kennerley, & Bannerman, 2004). Notably, a recent 
theory holds that ACC uses reinforcement learning signals 
conveyed by the midbrain dopamine system to update the 
response selection process (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). This 
theory proposes that the impact of these dopamine signals 
on the ACC modulates the amplitude of a component of 
the event-related brain potential (ERP) called the error-
related negativity (ERN). The ERN appears to exist in at 
least two forms: The “response ERN” (rERN) reflects a 
difference in neural processing between error responses 
and correct responses in speeded response time (RT) tasks 
(Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1990; 
Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993), and the 
“feedback ERN” (fERN) reflects a difference in neural 
processing between error feedback and correct feedback 
in guessing and trial-and-error learning tasks (Holroyd 
& Krigolson, 2007; Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997; for 
reviews, see Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Mars, & Coles, 2004; 
Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, Mol, & Coles, 2004). Further-
more, experiments in the monkey have demonstrated that 
the midbrain dopamine system carries “reward prediction 
error signals”; phasic increases and decreases from base-
line firing rate follow unexpected rewards and absences 
of reward, respectively (Schultz, 2002), which are then 
used by the targets of the dopamine system for the pur-
pose of reinforcement learning (Montague, Hyman, & 
Cohen, 2004). Because of this property, the dopamine/
ERN  theory—sometimes called the reinforcement learn-
ing theory of the ERN, or RL–ERN theory—predicts that 
fERN amplitude should be monotonically related to the 
unexpectedness of the outcome: When measured as the 
difference between the ERPs associated with correct and 
error trials, relatively large fERNs will be elicited by un-
expected outcomes, whereas relatively small fERNs will 
be elicited by expected outcomes (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; 
Holroyd & Krigolson, 2007; see also Holroyd, Pakzad-
Vaezi, & Krigolson, 2008).
There is now a great deal of evidence that the ERN 
indexes a reward prediction error signal (Baker & Hol-
royd, in press; Butterfield & Mangels, 2003; Cohen & 
Ranganath, 2007; Compton et al., 2007; Donkers & van 
Boxtel, 2005; Dunning & Hajcak, 2007; Eppinger, Kray, 
Mock, & Mecklinger, 2008; Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & 
Simons, 2007; Hewig et al., 2007, 2008; Holroyd & Coles, 
2002, 2008; Holroyd & Krigolson, 2007; Holroyd, Nieu-
wenhuis, Yeung, & Cohen, 2003; Krigolson & Holroyd, 
2007; Krigolson, Mathewson, Baker, Baker, & Holroyd, 
2006; Krigolson, Pierce, Holroyd, & Tanaka, in press; 
Morris, Heerey, Gold, & Holroyd, 2008; Nieuwenhuis, 
Nielen, Mol, Hajcak, & Veltman, 2005; Nieuwenhuis 
et al., 2002; Yasuda, Sato, Miyawaki, Kumano, & Kuboki, 
2004). Nevertheless, a study by Hajcak, Holroyd, Moser, 
and Simons (2005) failed to confirm this prediction (see 
also Donkers, Nieuwenhuis, & van Boxtel, 2005; Larson, 
Kelly, Stigge-Kaufman, Schmalfuss, & Perlstein, 2007). In 
that study, participants were asked to complete two guess-
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to in tasks in which the feedback stimuli are delivered at 
random.
ExpErimEnt 1
In the Hajcak et al. (2005) study, participants selected 
between four “doors” displayed on a computer screen 
to find a reward (USD $0.10) on each trial. At the start 
of each trial, a predictive cue indicated whether rewards 
would be hidden behind one, two, or three doors, indicat-
ing reward probabilities of 25%, 50%, or 75%, respec-
tively. The fERN was measured across three conditions 
using the difference wave approach (Holroyd & Krigolson, 
2007). For each participant, the ERP associated with un-
expected reward trials (rewards following the 25% cue) 
was subtracted from the ERP associated with unexpected 
nonreward trials (nonrewards following the 75% cue), cre-
ating an “unexpected difference wave.” The ERP associ-
ated with expected reward trials (rewards following the 
75% cue) was subtracted from the ERP associated with 
expected nonreward trials (nonrewards following the 25% 
cue), creating an “expected difference wave”; and the ERP 
associated with intermediate reward trials (rewards follow-
ing the 50% cue) was subtracted from the ERP associated 
with intermediate nonreward trials (nonrewards following 
the 50% cue), creating a “control difference wave.” The 
RL–ERN theory predicts that fERN amplitude should be 
monotonically related to the expectedness of the outcome, 
so that the unexpected difference wave should be larger 
than the control difference wave, which in turn should be 
larger than the expected difference wave. However, this 
was not the case: Hajcak et al. (2005) found that the dif-
ference waves reached about the same maximum ampli-
tude, irrespective of condition. As was noted above, these 
unexpected results challenge the validity of the RL–ERN 
theory, which would appear to apply to this task just as it 
does to other tasks that have confirmed its predictions.
In the Hajcak et al. (2005) study, it was suggested that 
the sensitivity of fERN amplitude to reward probability 
might be highly nonlinear, such that probabilities between 
25% and 75% were not extreme enough to modulate 
fERN amplitude significantly. In particular, participants 
may be relatively better at detecting extreme differences 
in probability than they are at detecting small differences 
in probability. To test this hypothesis, in Experiment 1, we 
skewed the reward probabilities even further, from 25%–
75% to 5%–95%, so that on each trial, a predictive cue 
indicated whether 1, 10, or 19 out of 20 doors hid rewards 
(Figure 1, top). As before, the RL–ERN theory predicts 
that fERN amplitude should increase monotonically with 
the unexpectedness of the outcome.
method
participants. Twenty undergraduate students at the University 
of Victoria (8 male; mean age 5 19.7 6 2.1 years) participated in 
the experiment. All of the participants were volunteers who received 
extra credit in a first- or second-year psychology course for their 
participation, and who had provided written, informed consent. Par-
ticipants also earned a small monetary bonus that depended on their 
performance (about CAN $5; see below). The study was conducted 
in accordance with the ethical standards prescribed in the Declara-
ing tasks. In a first experiment, on each trial, participants 
were presented with a cue that indicated whether one, two, 
or three out of four doors presented on a computer display 
hid a reward, and they were then required to choose one 
of the doors. Thus, the cue indicated a 25%, 50%, or 75% 
chance of finding a reward on each trial. Contrary to the 
prediction of the RL–ERN theory, although the amplitude 
of the fERN was differentially modulated by reward and 
nonreward feedback, the degree of this modulation was 
not affected by reward probability. Likewise, in a second 
experiment, participants selected among four “balloons” 
displayed on a computer screen. In each block, partici-
pants were rewarded at random on 25%, 50%, or 75% of 
the trials, and could thus infer whether they were relatively 
more or less likely to find the reward. Nevertheless, as 
with the first experiment, reward and nonreward feedback 
differentially affected fERN amplitude, but this effect was 
not modulated by reward probability. Note that although 
statistical power could be a factor underlying this result, 
the number of participants in the Hajcak et al. (2005) study 
were comparable to that in most fERN experiments.
At first blush, the RL–ERN theory would appear to 
apply to these guessing tasks, just as it applies to any task 
involving performance feedback. Thus, this failure to con-
firm the central prediction of the RL–ERN theory would 
seem to undermine its validity. Alternatively, given the 
evidence cited previously in favor of the theory, we think 
it likely that the theory is correct but that the tasks used 
by Hajcak et al. (2005) lie outside its domain of applica-
bility.1 Despite preserving the theory, however, this pos-
sibility would curtail the theory’s predictive power: Until 
the theory’s domain is better characterized, its continued 
application would risk yielding still more negative results. 
For this reason, we have sought to identify the essential 
factor or factors that distinguish the tasks used by Hajcak 
et al. (2005) from other tasks that have provided support 
for the RL–ERN theory.
In the present article, we investigated this issue in a se-
ries of three experiments.2 Our empirical approach began 
with a task that closely resembled those used by Hajcak 
et al. (2005); then, we systematically modified the task 
so that it more closely resembled those that provided sup-
port for the RL–ERN theory. In Experiment 1, we tested 
the hypothesis raised by Hajcak et al. (2005) that fERN 
amplitude may be nonlinearly related to the size of the 
reward prediction error. That is, participants may find it 
easier to discriminate larger probability differences than 
smaller probability differences, so fERN amplitude may 
be relatively more exercised by extremely unexpected 
events than by moderately unexpected events. In Experi-
ment 2, we tested the hypothesis that the reward predic-
tion effect depends on a feature of many successful fERN 
tasks—namely, that participants learn to associate the re-
ward probabilities with arbitrary predictive stimuli, rather 
than extract the probabilities from explicitly provided cues 
(as was the case in the Hajcak et al., 2005 study). Finally, 
in Experiment 3, we tested the hypothesis that the reward-
prediction error effect occurs in tasks with meaningful 
and consistent stimulus–response mappings—which is 
also characteristic of other fERN studies—as opposed 
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reward and nonreward feedback were delivered at random without 
replacement, in accordance with the probability of the predictive cue 
on each trial, but independent of the response selected.
Data acquisition. The electroencephalogram (EEG) was re-
corded from 36 electrode locations using BrainVision Recorder 
software (Version 1.3, Brainproducts, Munich, Germany). The elec-
trodes were mounted in a fitted cap with a standard 10–20 layout 
and were referenced to the average voltage across channels. The 
vertical and horizontal electrooculogram were recorded from elec-
trodes placed above and below the right eye and on the outer canthi 
of the left and right eyes, respectively. Electrode impedances were 
kept below 10 kΩ. The EEG data were sampled at 250 Hz, ampli-
fied (Quick Amp, Brainproducts, Munich), and filtered through a 
passband of 0.017 Hz–67.5 Hz (90 dB/octave roll-off ).
Data analysis. The EEG data were filtered offline through a 
0.1 Hz–20 Hz passband phase-shift-free Butterworth filter and re-
referenced to linked mastoids. Ocular artifacts were removed using 
the algorithm described by Gratton, Coles, and Donchin (1983). Tri-
als in which the change in voltage at any channel exceeded 35 μVs 
per sampling point were also discarded. In total, fewer than 5% of 
the data were discarded. An 800-msec epoch of data (from 200 msec 
before the feedback stimulus onset to 600 msec following feedback 
stimulus onset) was extracted from the continuous EEG for each 
trial, channel, and participant. These epochs were baseline corrected 
relative to the 200-msec segment preceding feedback stimulus onset 
by subtracting the average value of the baseline from the potential at 
each sample in the epoch. ERPs were created by averaging the EEG 
data by condition for each electrode channel and participant.
To isolate variance in the ERP associated with the fERN from 
other overlapping ERP components, we created difference waves 
by subtracting each reward ERP from its appropriate corresponding 
nonreward ERP (Hajcak et al., 2005; Holroyd & Krigolson, 2007). 
Specifically, for each participant and channel, we created three fERN 
difference waves by (1) subtracting the reward ERP in the 50% condi-
tion from the nonreward ERP in the 50% condition, creating a “con-
trol” difference wave; (2) subtracting the reward ERP in the 5% re-
tion of Helsinki and was approved by the human subjects review 
board at the University of Victoria.
Apparatus and procedure. Participants were seated com-
fortably in front of a computer monitor in an electromagnetically 
shielded booth, and they engaged in a modified version of the cued 
door selection task utilized in Hajcak et al. (2005). On each trial, 
participants were presented with an image that indicated whether 
1, 10, or 19 doors out of 20 hid rewards (1,500 msec; 8.5º of visual 
angle); these images were displayed as colored scales that indicated 
the relative probabilities of finding the reward (a picture of a dollar 
adjacent to a green scale) versus not finding the reward (a picture 
of a bomb adjacent to a red scale; Figure 1, top). Participants were 
informed of the meaning of these stimuli at the outset of the experi-
ment; note that 1, 10, and 19 doors correspond to probabilities of 5%, 
50%, and 95%, respectively. Then, participants were presented with 
an image of a 5 3 4 array of blue rectangles representing 20 “doors”; 
this image remained on the screen for 2,000 msec or until the par-
ticipant selected a door, whichever came first (9º of visual angle; 
Figure 1, top). Response selection was carried out by using a mouse 
to direct a cursor in the form of a white arrow to the desired door and 
then pressing a mouse button. Immediately upon response selection, 
the chosen door changed color to white. This image—including the 
cursor, door array, and selected door—remained on the screen for 
200 msec. Then, a visual feedback stimulus appeared (2º of visual 
angle, 500-msec duration) in the form of several dollar bills for re-
ward, a bomb for no reward, and a turtle if participants responded too 
slowly, which was presented whenever the participant’s RT exceeded 
2,000 msec. Participants were told that they would earn CAN $0.25 
by finding the reward, that they would be penalized CAN $0.23 if 
they did not find the reward, and that they would be penalized CAN 
$0.50 if they responded too slowly. All images were presented against 
a black background, and the intertrial interval (ITI) was 1,000 msec. 
Participants completed 10 blocks of 100 trials. Within each block, 4 
trials corresponded to 5% probability (2 reward, 2 nonreward), 20 tri-
als corresponded to 50% probability (10 reward, 10 nonreward), and 
76 trials corresponded to 95% probability (38 reward, 38 nonreward); 
Experiment 3
1,000 msec 500 msec300 msec 500 msec
@
Experiment 2
2,000 msec
Maximum 500 msec200 msec 300 msec
Experiment 1
1,500 msec 500 msec
2,000 msec
Maximum 200 msec
Figure 1. Experimental tasks. An example trial is illustrated for each experi-
ment; stimulus durations are given below each image. the intertrial interval for 
Experiments 1 and 2 was 1,000 msec (not shown).
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p , .01, h2p 5 0.28]. The amplitude of the fERN was 
larger in the unexpected condition (26.8 6 0.6 μV) than 
in the expected condition (24.3 6 0.3 μV) [t(19) 5 3.5, 
p , .005, Cohen’s d 5 1.6], and larger in the unexpected 
condition than in the control condition (24.8 6 0.4 μV) 
[t(19) 5 2.4, p , .05, Cohen’s d 5 1.1], but the control and 
expected conditions were not significantly different from 
each other [t(19) 5 1.2, p 5 .23, Cohen’s d 5 0.6]. fERN 
latencies are indicated in Table 1 for each condition.
ExpErimEnt 2
The results of Experiment 1 confirmed our hypothesis 
that fERN amplitude would be modulated by the large 
reward prediction errors associated with the relatively ex-
treme reward probabilities in this task (5%–95%), providing 
further support for the RL–ERN theory. However, the ef-
fect size associated with this finding was rather small (h2p 5 
0.28), despite the fact that the study included 20 partici-
ward condition from the nonreward ERP in the 95% reward condition, 
creating an “unexpected” difference wave; and (3) subtracting the re-
ward ERP in the 95% reward condition from the nonreward ERP in 
the 5% reward condition, creating an “expected” difference wave. The 
amplitude of each difference wave was measured for each participant 
and electrode as the most negative deflection within the 0–600 msec 
following feedback stimulus onset. Consistent with previous studies, 
fERN amplitude was evaluated at channel FCz, where it is normally 
maximal (Holroyd & Krigolson, 2007; Miltner et al., 1997).
results
Figure 2 (left column) illustrates the ERPs recorded at 
channel FCz elicited by unexpected, control, and expected 
reward and nonreward feedback stimuli, respectively, and 
Figure 3 (top) illustrates the difference waves associated 
with these ERPs. Each of the difference waves reached 
maximum amplitude at channel FCz; Figure 4 (left column) 
shows their associated scalp distributions. An ANOVA per-
formed across the three conditions indicated that fERN 
amplitude was modulated by condition [F(2,19) 5 7.57, 
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Figure 2. Event-related brain potentials elicited by reward and nonreward feedback stimuli for the unexpected, control, and expected 
conditions. Zero on each abscissa indicates time of feedback stimulus onset. negative is plotted up by convention. Data recorded at 
channel FCz.
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pants, more than the 10–15 participants typically utilized in 
other fERN studies. Moreover, although fERN amplitude 
was larger in the unexpected condition than in the expected 
condition, and was larger in the unexpected condition than 
in the control condition, it was not larger in the control 
condition than in the expected condition, so fERN ampli-
tude was not monotonically related to reward probability, 
as predicted by the RL–ERN theory. In short, a study that 
used extreme probabilities together with a relatively large 
number of participants produced only modest results. These 
findings suggest that participants are not particularly sensi-
tive to extremely unexpected outcomes in comparison with 
less unexpected outcomes; thus, the failure to confirm the 
predictions of the RL–ERN theory in the study by Hajcak 
et al. (2005) did not result from this possibility.
Hence, in Experiment 2, we tested a second hypothesis 
that might explain the failure in the Hajcak et al. (2005) 
study to replicate the standard fERN reward prediction 
error result. This hypothesis was predicated on the observa-
tion that in several previous fERN experiments, participants 
learned by trial and error how to respond to visual images of 
arbitrary objects (see, e.g., Eppinger et al., 2008; Holroyd & 
Coles, 2002; Morris et al., 2008; Nieuwenhuis, Nielen et al., 
2005; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002). We speculated that fERN 
amplitude would be modulated by reward probability when 
participants learn to associate reward probabilities with pre-
dictive cues, as opposed to when the probabilities are ex-
plicitly indicated by the predictive cues on the start of each 
trial (as in Experiment 1; Figure 1, top). As such, in Experi-
ment 2, participants were shown visual images of arbitrary 
objects (specifically, a cherry, pineapple, banana, piano, 
guitar, trumpet, plane, bus, and boat; Figure 1, middle) at 
the start of each trial and, rather than being told explicitly 
the probabilities associated with each cue, the participants 
were required to infer the probabilities by trial and error. Ad-
ditional, relatively minor task changes are described below.
method
Except where noted, all of the procedures were identical to those 
in Experiment 1.
participants. Fifteen undergraduate students at the University 
of Victoria (7 male; mean age 5 20.5 6 2.6 years) participated in 
the experiment.
Apparatus and procedure. The following changes were made 
to the task used in Experiment 1.
1. As was noted previously, rather than show participants cues that 
explicitly indicated the probability of reward on that trial as in Ex-
periment 1 (Figure 1, top), in Experiment 2, participants were shown 
visual images of arbitrary objects (cherry, pineapple, banana, piano, 
guitar, trumpet, plane, bus, and boat; Figure 1, middle). Participants 
were not told the probabilities associated with each cue and instead 
had to infer them by trial and error. The mappings between the ob-
jects and the reward conditions were fixed throughout each block so 
that the participants could, in fact, learn to associate each cue with 
a probability of reward. The experiment consisted of three blocks of 
trials, with 300 trials per block; a different set of three probability 
cues was associated with each block.
2. Because the extreme reward probabilities utilized in Experi-
ment 1 were only modestly successful in modulating fERN ampli-
tude, we assumed that this factor was not critical and thus relaxed 
this constraint. Accordingly, in Experiment 2, we adopted a narrower 
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Figure 3. Feedback error–related negativity difference waves 
associated with the unexpected, control, and expected conditions. 
Zero on each abscissa indicates time of feedback stimulus onset. 
negative is plotted up by convention. Data are associated with 
channel FCz. note the different scales on the ordinate for each 
experiment.
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“g”). By doing so, the selected door turned black and the predictive 
cue disappeared; this image remained on the screen for 200 msec. 
Then, a fixation cue (0.5º of visual angle) appeared above the doors, 
which together remained on the screen for a further 300 msec. Fi-
nally, the feedback stimulus was presented in the location of the 
previous fixation cue; the image of the feedback and doors remained 
on the screen for 500 msec. All images were presented against a 
white background, and the ITI was 1,000 msec. The experiment 
consisted of three 300-trial blocks. In each block, one of the three 
imperative stimuli was associated with reward on 20 trials and with 
nonreward on 80 trials (20% reward probability), a second stimulus 
was associated with reward on 50 trials and with nonreward on 50 
trials (50% reward probability), and the third stimulus was associ-
ated with reward on 80 trials and with nonreward on 20 trials (80% 
reward probability).
Data acquisition. Data acquisition was the same as in Experi-
ment 1.
Data analysis. ERPs were created in the same way as in Experi-
ment 1. For each participant and channel, three fERN difference 
waves were created by (1) subtracting the reward ERP in the 50% 
condition from the nonreward ERP in the 50% condition, creating a 
control difference wave; (2) subtracting the reward ERP in the 20% 
reward condition from the nonreward ERP in the 80% reward condi-
tion, creating an unexpected difference wave; and (3) subtracting the 
reward ERP in the 80% reward condition from the nonreward ERP in 
the 20% reward condition, creating an expected difference wave.
results
Figure 2 (middle column) illustrates the ERPs elicited 
by the unexpected, control, and expected reward and non-
reward feedback, respectively. Figure 3 (middle) illustrates 
the difference waves associated with these ERPs, and 
Figure 4 (middle column) illustrates the associated scalp 
distributions. The difference waves reached maximum 
range of reward probabilities (20%, 50%, 80%) that allowed more 
trials to be obtained per condition. Thus, on each trial, participants 
selected 1 of 5 doors rather than 1 of 20 doors (Figure 1, middle).
3. To ensure that the participants did not simply ignore the cues, 
the images of the objects and doors appeared together and re-
mained on the display until either the participant made a response or 
2,000 msec had elapsed, whichever occurred first (Figure 1, middle). 
This design contrasts with that of Experiment 1, where the predictive 
cue was removed before the door image appeared (Figure 1, top).
4. In order to not confound the feedback stimuli with the cue im-
ages, reward, nonreward, and “too slow” feedback consisted of the 
typographical symbols “%”, “&”, and “@”, the mappings of which 
were systematically varied across participants. (Note that the re-
sponse deadline was the same as in Experiment 1: 2,000 msec.) Par-
ticipants earned CAN$0.02 for each reward feedback stimulus and 
earned nothing for each nonreward feedback stimulus; they were 
penalized CAN$0.10 for each too-slow feedback stimulus. On aver-
age, each participant earned about CAN$8.50 in bonus money.
5. To summarize, each trial began with the predictive cue image 
(1.3º of visual angle) presented directly above an array of five brown 
rectangles signifying five doors (8.5º of visual angle; Figure 1, mid-
dle). This image remained on the screen for 2,000 msec, or until the 
participant made a response. Response selection occurred by press-
ing one of five keys on a standard keyboard (“a,” “s,” “d,” “f,” and 
Unexpected
Control
Expected
Experiment 1 Experiment 3Experiment 2
Figure 4. Scalp distributions associated with the feedback error–related negativity for the unex-
pected, control, and expected conditions.
table 1 
means and Standard Deviations (in milliseconds)  
of Feedback Ern Latencies
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
  M  SD  M  SD  M  SD
Frequent 291 17 275 10 298 34
Control 281 24 311 16 351 25
Infrequent  249  32  327  28  352  25
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ation of this paradigm, Nieuwenhuis et al. (2002) included 
an “80% condition” whereby the appropriate response was 
mapped to each cue with an 80% probability of reward. 
If, on these trials, the participants always responded with 
the optimal response, then they would be rewarded 80% 
of the time. In the Nieuwenhuis et al. (2002) study also, 
fERN amplitude was consistent with the predictions of 
the theory: In particular, the fERN was especially large 
in the condition in which the reward prediction error was 
biggest—namely, when participants selected the optimal 
response in the 80% condition but nevertheless received 
no-reward feedback.
Considering these observations, we hypothesized that a 
key ingredient missing from the designs of Experiments 1 
and 2 was the dependence of the feedback on the partici-
pants’ actual behavior. Although debriefing indicated that 
many participants believed that they had discovered an 
appropriate strategy for maximizing reward, we expected 
that such beliefs would be even stronger if the feedback 
did, in fact, depend on their behavior. Accordingly, we 
altered the task in Experiment 2 so that, as with previ-
ous studies, the appropriate response mappings were as-
sociated probabilistically with individual stimulus cues 
(Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Our design resembled that of 
Nieuwenhuis et al. (2002), which included an 80% con-
dition in addition to the 100% and 50% conditions that 
were utilized in the study of Holroyd and Coles (2002).3 
Importantly, the 80% condition provides a strong test of 
the theory, since the feedback stimuli in this condition 
elicit relatively large reward prediction errors. Thus, we 
modified our experiments so that for each stimulus, an 
appropriate response could actually be learned, in the ex-
pectation that this change would increase the sensitivity 
of fERN amplitude to reward probability. As with Experi-
ments 1 and 2, the RL–ERN theory predicts that fERN 
amplitude should increase monotonically with the unex-
pectedness of the outcome.
method
The method was the same as that used in Experiment 2, except 
where noted.
participants. Fifteen undergraduate students at the University 
of Victoria (9 male; mean age 5 20.6 6 1.5 years) participated in 
the experiment.
Apparatus and procedure. On each trial, an imperative stimulus 
consisting of a visual image of an object (or animal) was displayed 
for 1,000 msec (1.3º of visual angle; Figure 1, bottom); participants 
were required to respond within these 1,000 msec. This stimulus was 
followed by a blank screen for 300 msec. Then, a feedback stimu-
lus was displayed for 500 msec. Feedback consisted of “%”, “@”, 
and “&” symbols (1.3º of visual angle), indicating that participants 
earned CAN$0.02, lost CAN$0.00, or responded too slowly and 
lost CAN$0.10, respectively. The stimulus–feedback mappings were 
systematically varied across participants. All images were presented 
against a white background, and the ITI was 500 msec. On average, 
each participant earned about CAN$9 in bonus money.
Participants completed three blocks of 300 trials, and on each 
block, they were exposed to six novel visual stimuli. Participants 
responded by pressing a left mouse button for one response, and a 
right mouse button for the other. Critically, for each stimulus, one 
response never yielded a reward, whereas the other response yielded 
a reward on some proportion of the trials. Thus, participants could 
learn an optimal response for each stimulus. Furthermore, the prob-
amplitude at channel FCz in the unexpected condition 
(28.2 μV) and channel Cz in the control (27.5 μV) and 
the expected (26.1 μV) conditions; the difference between 
the voltages recorded at FCz and Cz was significant for 
the control condition [t(14) 5 3.25, p 5 .005], but not for 
the expected condition ( p . .05). An ANOVA performed 
across the three conditions indicated that fERN amplitude 
was modulated by condition [F(2,14) 5 4.6, p , .05, h2p 5 
0.24]. The amplitude of the fERN was larger in the unex-
pected condition (28.2 6 1.0 μV) than in the expected 
condition (25.9 6 0.5 μV) [t(14) 5 2.3, p , .05, Co-
hen’s d 5 1.2], and it was larger in the control condition 
(26.9 6 0.6 μV) than in the expected condition [t(14) 5 
2.4, p , .05, Cohen’s d 5 1.3], but the control and un-
expected conditions were not significantly different from 
each other [t(14) 5 1.7, p 5 .11, Cohen’s d 5 0.9]. fERN 
latencies are indicated in Table 1 for each condition.
ExpErimEnt 3
The results of Experiment 2 confirmed our hypothesis that 
fERN amplitude would depend on reward probability when 
participants are required to learn by trial and error to associ-
ate the probabilities with visual images of objects, as was 
found in previous experiments (e.g.,  Eppinger et al., 2008; 
Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Morris et al., 2008; Nieuwenhuis, 
Nielen et al., 2005; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002). Neverthe-
less, as with Experiment 1, the effect size associated with 
this finding was modest (h2p 5 0.24). Furthermore, fERN 
amplitude was not monotonically related to reward prob-
ability, once again failing to confirm fully all of the predic-
tions of the RL–ERN theory. Thus, the critical ingredient 
for modulating fERN amplitude as a function of reward 
probability does not appear to be associated with any of the 
factors that were changed in Experiments 1 and 2—namely, 
the degree of reward expectancy and whether reward prob-
abilities are learned by trial and error.
Hence, in Experiment 3, we examined whether yet an-
other factor might contribute to modulating fERN am-
plitude in the predicted manner. An important difference 
between the first two experiments and many other fERN 
studies is that the feedback was delivered entirely at ran-
dom: Although individual participants may have believed 
that they discovered the optimal response strategy, no 
such strategy in fact existed. By contrast, in many other 
experiments, the type of feedback stimulus presented on 
each trial has depended partially on the participant’s own 
behavior. For example, following certain stimulus cues in 
Holroyd and Coles’s (2002) study, participants were al-
ways rewarded if they pressed one of two buttons and were 
always punished if they pressed the other button (“100% 
condition”), whereas following other cues in this study, 
participants were rewarded at random (50% probability), 
irrespective of the response actually made (“50% condi-
tion”). Consistent with the prediction of the RL–ERN 
theory, it was found that in the 100% condition, fERN 
amplitude decreased as participants learned the stimulus 
responses mappings, whereas in the 50% condition, fERN 
amplitude remained large throughout each block because 
the mappings could not be learned. Furthermore, in a vari-
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p , .0001, Cohen’s d 5 3.2], larger in the unexpected 
condition than in the control condition (24.2 6 0.4 μV) 
[t(14) 5 3.8, p , .005, Cohen’s d 5 2.0], and larger in the 
control condition than in the expected condition [t(14) 5 
3.3, p 5 .005, Cohen’s d 5 1.8]. fERN latencies are indi-
cated in Table 1 for each condition.
GEnErAL DiSCuSSion
The RL–ERN theory predicts that the amplitude of the 
fERN, measured as the maximal difference in the ERPs 
elicited by reward and nonreward feedback stimuli, will 
be larger for unexpected outcomes than for expected 
outcomes (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; see also Holroyd & 
Krigolson, 2007; Holroyd et al., 2008). Although the re-
sults of several experiments have supported this predic-
tion, the results of other experiments have not (see, e.g., 
Donkers et al., 2005; Hajcak et al., 2005; Larson et al., 
2007). These negative findings challenge the validity of 
the theory, curtail its predictive power, and undermine the 
position that the anterior cingulate cortex uses dopamine 
reward prediction error signals for the purpose of adap-
tive decision making (Holroyd & Coles, 2002, 2008). In 
the present article, we sought to better characterize the 
empirical domain to which the RL–ERN theory applies, 
specifically by investigating three possible reasons that 
might underlie the negative results reported by Hajcak 
et al. (2005).
First, Hajcak et al. (2005) suggested that fERN am-
plitude might be more sensitive to larger differences in 
reward probability than to smaller differences in reward 
probability, especially if participants fail to detect smaller 
differences. We tested this hypothesis in Experiment 1 by 
adopting a task that was modeled after that in Hajcak et al. 
(2005), but that included many more doors (20 instead 
of 4), enabling us to explore the consequence of relatively 
extreme reward probabilities (5%–95%) on the ERP. We 
reasoned that this modification would increase the vari-
ance in the size of the reward prediction error signals and 
concomitantly increase the variance in fERN amplitude. 
Nevertheless, our efforts were only partially successful. 
On the one hand, larger fERNs were, in fact, elicited by 
the unexpected outcomes as compared with the expected 
outcomes. On the other hand, the effect size associated 
with this result was relatively small (h2p 5 0.28), and the 
fERN was not significantly larger in a control condition 
than in the expected condition, which is inconsistent with 
the predictions of the RL–ERN theory. This result sug-
gests that fERN amplitude is not particularly sensitive 
to extreme probabilities in comparison with moderate 
probabilities.
We then tested a second hypothesis, which was that 
fERN amplitude would be more sensitive to reward prob-
abilities if these became associated with arbitrary visual 
stimuli by an associative learning process, as opposed to 
their being conveyed to the participants explicitly at the 
start of each trial. This hypothesis was motivated by the 
observation that many previous experiments that reported 
modulation of fERN amplitude by reward probability 
were constructed in this manner. For this reason, in Ex-
ability of reward associated with each optimal stimulus–response 
combination depended on the stimulus; the participants could learn 
that some stimuli were more likely than other stimuli to yield reward 
if the optimal response was selected. Specifically, for each block, 
following one stimulus, the left button was rewarded on 80% of the 
trials, and the right button was never rewarded; and, following a sec-
ond stimulus, the right button was rewarded on 80% of the trials, and 
the left button was never rewarded, so optimal responses following 
these stimuli were usually rewarded. Conversely, following a third 
stimulus, the left button was rewarded on 20% of the trials, and the 
right button was never rewarded; and, following a fourth stimulus, 
the right button was rewarded on 20% of the trials, and the left button 
was never rewarded, so optimal responses following these stimuli 
were rarely rewarded. Finally, following a fifth and a sixth stimulus, 
the left and the right buttons were rewarded, respectively, on 50% of 
the trials, whereas the alternative buttons were never rewarded, so 
optimal responses following these stimuli were rewarded on about 
half of the trials. Note that for each stimulus, one of the two possible 
responses was always partially rewarded (on 20%, 50%, or 80% of 
the trials), whereas the complementary response was never rewarded. 
Thus, participants could learn to choose the optimal response even in 
the 20% reward condition, in which the rewards were unlikely.
Data acquisition. Data acquisition was the same as in Experi-
ments 1 and 2.
Data analysis. ERPs were created in the same way as in Experi-
ments 1 and 2; only trials in which the optimal response was issued 
were analyzed. Three difference waves were formed by (1) subtract-
ing the reward ERP in the 50% reward condition from the nonre-
ward ERP in the 50% reward condition, creating a control difference 
wave; (2) subtracting the reward ERP in the 20% reward condition 
from the nonreward ERP in the 80% reward condition, creating an 
unexpected difference wave; and (3) subtracting the reward ERP 
in the 80% reward condition from the nonreward ERP in the 20% 
reward condition, creating an “expected” difference wave.
results
Behavioral data. Participants chose the optimal re-
sponse on a majority of trials in every condition: The op-
timal response was selected on 85.7% of the 80% reward 
trials [t(14) 5 19.6, p , .001], on 80.0% of the 50% re-
ward trials [t(14) 5 11.5, p , .001], and on 68.0% of the 
20% reward trials [t(14) 5 5.8, p , .001]. RTs differed 
across the three conditions [F(2,28) 5 16.0, p , .001] and 
were faster on 80% reward trials (499 msec) than on 50% 
reward trials (516 msec) [t(14) 5 2.55, p , .05], which 
in turn were faster than on 20% reward trials (537 msec) 
[t(14) 5 2.77, p , .05].
Electrophysiological data. Figure 2 (right column) 
shows the ERPs elicited by unexpected, control, and ex-
pected reward and nonreward feedback, respectively, and 
Figure 3 (bottom) illustrates the difference waves asso-
ciated with these ERPs. Figure 4 (right column) depicts 
the scalp distributions of these difference waves. The dif-
ference waves reached maximum amplitude at channel 
FCz in the unexpected (26.8 μV) and control (24.2 μV) 
conditions, and at channel CP2 in the expected condition 
(22.8 μV), but the amplitude of the difference wave for 
the expected condition was not significantly different be-
tween channels FCz and CP2 ( p . .05). An ANOVA per-
formed across the three conditions indicated that fERN 
amplitude was modulated by condition [F(2,14) 5 22.7, 
p , .0001, h2p 5 0.62]. The amplitude of the fERN was 
larger in the unexpected condition (26.8 6 0.6 μV) than 
in the expected condition (22.7 6 0.4 μV) [t(14) 5 6.1, 
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by the external cues, but also as a function of the subjec-
tive reward probabilities internalized by each participant. 
Interestingly, Hajcak et al. (2007) found that fERN ampli-
tude did not correspond to the participants’ own predic-
tions when the participants were asked before they made 
their responses, but it did correspond to their predictions 
when they were asked after they made their responses. 
Thus, fERN amplitude was seen to vary with subjective 
expectation only when the prediction was made follow-
ing a choice. The authors suggested that the predictions 
solidified on each trial after the participant committed 
to a particular action, perhaps because of increased at-
tention to or confidence in the action–outcome associa-
tions. Similarly, a recent study of rat midbrain dopamine 
neurons demonstrated that reward predictions can be re-
vised by the  response-selection process (Roesch, Calu, & 
Schoenbaum, 2007)—an observation that seems consis-
tent with the fact that the response ERN is seen immedi-
ately following error responses (Holroyd, Yeung, Coles, & 
Cohen, 2005). Taken with the present results, these find-
ings suggest that the degree to which reward expectation 
modulates fERN amplitude depends strongly on whether 
each outcome can be attributed to a meaningful causal be-
havior. To the extent that participants do not perceive any 
action–outcome contingencies, fERN amplitude appears 
to be less sensitive to reward probability.
Note that this issue is different from the related question 
of whether fERN amplitude depends on behavior per se. 
In fact, several experiments have demonstrated that the 
fERN can be elicited by outcomes that are not immediately 
preceded by an overt behavior (Donkers & van Boxtel, 
2005; Potts, Martin, Burton, & Montague, 2006; Yeung, 
Holroyd, & Cohen, 2005). Our present results extend this 
finding by indicating that variance in fERN amplitude as 
a function of reward probability depends on the degree to 
which the outcomes are perceived to be elicited by causal 
behaviors. Of course, it does not follow that perceived 
causality is a sufficient or even a necessary condition for 
modulating fERN amplitude; rather, it is undoubtedly 
one of several related factors that conspire to determine 
fERN amplitude in any given context. For example, fERN 
amplitude is correlated with participants’ interest in the 
outcomes (Yeung et al., 2005). One might suppose that 
participants take greater interest in tasks in which they 
perceive a causal connection between their actions and 
outcomes, so that in these instances, fERN amplitude 
would be relatively sensitive to reward probability.
These results support the theory that the ACC uses re-
ward prediction error signals conveyed by the midbrain 
dopamine system for the adaptive modification of behav-
ior (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Although the results of fMRI 
studies have been suggestive in this regard (Bush et al., 
2002; Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, et al., 2004; Klein 
et al., 2007; Mars et al., 2005; Ullsperger & von Cramon, 
2003; see also Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, & Rushworth, 
2007; Nieuwenhuis, Slagter, von Geusau, Heslenfeld, & 
Holroyd, 2005; Paulus, Hozack, Frank, & Brown, 2002; 
Van Veen, Holroyd, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2004), 
those of intracranial studies in both monkeys and humans 
have been particularly illuminating. This research has 
periment 2, we modified the task used in Experiment 1 so 
that instead of presenting predictive cues that expressly 
indicated the probability of reward (with scales that indi-
cated the number of doors hiding a reward), we presented 
visual images of arbitrary objects that participants could 
learn to associate with particular reward probabilities. 
Nevertheless, this change was also only partially success-
ful. Consistent with the RL–ERN theory, the fERN was 
larger following unexpected outcomes than it was follow-
ing expected outcomes, but again, the statistical effect was 
relatively small (h2p 5 0.24). Furthermore, contrary to the 
prediction of the RL–ERN theory, the fERN was not larger 
for unexpected outcomes than for control outcomes. Fi-
nally, for the control condition, fERN amplitude was actu-
ally significantly larger at channel Cz than at channel FCz, 
which deviates somewhat from the typical fERN scalp 
distribution (Holroyd & Krigolson, 2007; Miltner et al., 
1997). These results indicate that an associative learning 
process tying reward probability with arbitrary predictive 
cues is not sufficient for modulating fERN amplitude as a 
function of reward probability, despite the fact that such a 
learning process is characteristic of many previous fERN 
experiments.
Finally, in Experiment 3, we tested the hypothesis that 
fERN amplitude would be sensitive to reward probability 
in tasks in which stimulus–response contingencies could 
actually be learned. Thus, we modified the feedback con-
tingencies so that the participants could truly learn an opti-
mal response for every predictive cue. In contrast with the 
first two experiments, in which the type of feedback was 
delivered randomly and independently of each participant’s 
choice, in Experiment 3, one of two possible response op-
tions for each stimulus was never rewarded. Thus, the alter-
native response for each stimulus was always the optimal 
choice, even though those choices were rewarded on only a 
subset of trials (from 20% to 80%, depending on the predic-
tive cue). We found that participants learned to choose the 
optimal response across all three stimulus conditions. Fur-
ther, the fERN results conformed to the predictions of the 
RL–ERN theory, since its amplitude increased monotoni-
cally with the unexpectedness of the outcome. In addition, 
the effect size for this result was more than twice as large 
as that observed in the first two experiments (h2p 5 0.62). 
These findings strongly suggest that fERN amplitude is 
relatively sensitive to reward probability in tasks in which 
an optimal response can actually be learned, as opposed to 
tasks in which the feedback is delivered independently of 
the participant’s behavior. Note that this issue appears to be 
independent of the participants’ certainty of whether each 
trial would end in success or failure, because—insofar as 
the participants learned to choose the optimal response in 
Experiment 3—the probability of reward was the same in 
Experiment 3 as it was in Experiment 2 (20%, 50%, and 
80%), so both experiments should have been associated 
with comparable subjective probabilities.4
In a recent follow-up to their original door study, Haj-
cak et al. (2007) asked participants on each trial whether 
they believed that they would find the reward. In this 
way, fERN amplitude could be determined not only as 
a function of the objective reward probabilities indicated 
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sociated with trial-and-error learning (Isomura, Ito, Aka-
zawa, Nambu, & Takada, 2003; Isomura & Takada, 2004; 
Matsumoto & Tanaka, 2004; Procyk, Tanaka, & Joseph, 
2000). Consistent with the RL–ERN theory, ACC neurons 
are sensitive to the degree of reward expectancy (Shidara 
& Richmond, 2002) and appear to be especially important 
for motor selection on the basis of anticipation of reward 
(Akkal, Bioulac, Audin, & Burbaud, 2002; Matsumoto, 
Suzuki, & Tanaka, 2003; Quilodran, Rothe, & Procyk, 
2008). Furthermore, ACC neurons are sensitive to the 
omission of rewards (Ito, Stuphorn, Brown, & Schall, 
2003; Niki & Watanabe, 1979; Shima & Tanji, 1998; 
Williams, Bush, Rauch, Cosgrove, & Eskandar, 2004), 
respond differentially to stimuli that predict rewarding 
and aversive events (Nishijo et al., 1997), code for reward 
prediction errors associated with action selection (Amiez, 
Joseph, & Procyk, 2005; Matsumoto, Matsumoto, Abe, & 
Tanaka, 2007), and appear to produce fERN-like extra-
cellular potentials (Emeric et al., 2008; Halgren, Boujon, 
Clarke, Wang, & Chauvel, 2002; Wang, Ulbert, Schomer, 
Marinkovic, & Halgren, 2005). Moreover, disruption of 
ACC activity following the reduction of an expected re-
ward impairs the animal’s ability to switch to an alterna-
tive, more task-appropriate behavior (Shima & Tanji, 1998; 
Williams et al., 2004). Most significantly with respect to 
the present study, motor- related neurons in ACC are more 
active when rewards are presented following a correct 
response than when the rewards are obtained passively, 
suggesting that this neural area uses reward information 
for the purpose of reinforcing adaptive behaviors asso-
ciated with meaningful stimulus–response contingencies 
(Michelet, Bioulac, Guehl, Escola, & Burbaud, 2007). By 
contrast, there appears to be less evidence that the mon-
key ACC is involved in monitoring for response conflict 
as predicted by the conflict monitoring theory of ACC 
(Emeric et al., 2008; Nakamura, Roesch, & Olson, 2005). 
Taken together, the human ERN and primate  single-cell 
findings are broadly consistent with the position that ACC 
integrates reinforcement history over time to guide volun-
tary behavior (Holroyd & Coles, 2008; Kennerley, Wal-
ton, Behrens, Buckley, & Rushworth, 2006).
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responses from the ERPs associated with valid error feedback following 
suboptimal responses, and unexpected difference waves were created by 
subtracting the ERPs associated with invalid correct feedback following 
suboptimal responses from the ERPs associated with invalid error feed-
back following optimal responses. Although it was found that the unex-
pected difference wave was larger than the expected difference wave, this 
analysis was complicated by the fact that the number of trials associated 
with each ERP differed markedly across the four conditions, since par-
ticipants were exposed to relatively many valid correct trials and rela-
tively few invalid correct trials. For example, participants who selected 
the optimal response on 80% of the trials (i.e., who probability matched; 
Grant, Hake, & Hornseth, 1951) would have received valid correct feed-
back on 64% of the trials, invalid error feedback on 16% of the trials, 
invalid correct feedback on 4% of the trials, and valid error feedback 
on 16% of the trials. Furthermore, participants learned to favor the op-
timal response over the suboptimal response as each block progressed. 
Thus, the prediction errors associated with the suboptimal responses 
would have tended to occur early in learning before the reward predic-
tions had fully developed, whereas the prediction errors associated with 
the optimal responses would have tended to occur late in learning after 
the reward predictions had more fully developed. A consequence of this 
design was that the conditions were not truly counterbalanced. Because 
P300 amplitude is larger for unexpected than for expected outcomes, it is 
possible that the difference wave approach would not have successfully 
removed P300 overlap from the fERN measure (Holroyd & Krigolson, 
2007). For this reason, in Experiment 3, we modified the task so as to 
eliminate this confound (see the Method section for Experiment 3).
4. At the same time, it should be remembered that other task changes 
could have also contributed to this result. For example, whereas Experi-
ment 3 required participants to select between two choices, Experiments 
1 and 2 required them to select between 20 and 5 choices, respectively; 
perhaps participants have increased confidence in their predictions when 
their options are limited. Likewise, in contrast with the first two ex-
periments, Experiment 3 did not use the door stimuli, which may have 
increased attentional resources devoted to the visual cue. It is also pos-
sible that in Experiment 2, participants would have developed stronger 
expectations about the stimulus–reward associations had they been ex-
posed to more trials.
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notES
1. It is not surprising that the predictions of this or any theory do not 
obtain in all situations. As is well known, even Newton’s laws of motion 
do not hold at very small scales, very high speeds, or in very strong 
gravitational fields.
2. These results have been presented previously in poster format 
(Baker, Krigolson, & Holroyd, 2006; Gibson, Krigolson, & Holroyd, 
2006; Lee, Krigolson, & Holroyd, 2006). Since then, we have modified 
the window size for determining fERN amplitude, which has altered 
their statistical significance somewhat. However, the overall pattern of 
results across the three experiments remains the same.
3. Critically, in doing so, we sought to correct for an inelegance as-
sociated with the original Nieuwenhuis et al. (2002) experiment. In the 
80% condition of that study, participants received feedback that was ei-
ther consistent (i.e., valid) or inconsistent (i.e., invalid) with the selected 
response. Thus, participants received valid correct feedback and invalid 
error feedback following the optimal response, and invalid correct feed-
back and valid error feedback following the suboptimal response. To 
examine the fERN, expected difference waves were created by subtract-
ing the ERPs associated with valid correct feedback following optimal 
